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State v.Jackson: Police Use of Trickery, Threats, and
Deception-What Price Confession?
For a criminal confession to be admissible, it must have been given voluntarily.' Involuntary confessions are excluded because such statements are
unreliable as evidence, and because of the belief that coercive techniques
should not be countenanced by a civilized society, regardless of the importance of the information they may yield. 2 In determining whether a confes-

sion was rendered voluntarily, courts have applied a "totality of
circumstances" test.3 Under this test a court examines the totality of the cir-

cumstances surrounding a confession and then decides whether it was given
' 4

voluntarily or whether the defendant's will was "overborne.
In State v. Jackson5 the North Carolina Supreme Court applied the totality of circumstances test and reached a decision that broadens the parameters

of acceptable police conduct during noncustodial interrogations 6 to previously
unimagined dimensions. By holding that the use of fabricated evidence, false
statements, and implied threats was not sufficient to render defendant's confes-

sion involuntary, 7 the court implicitly condoned such unconscionable behav1. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959);
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
2. C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 15.01 (1980).
3. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963). In Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558
(1954), the Court emphasized that each case involving a question of voluntariness must be decided
on its own facts. It was not until 1956, in Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957), however,
that the Court first used the phrase "totality of the circumstances" in relation to voluntariness. See
also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) ("[v]oluntariness is a question of fact
to be determined from all the circumstances"); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963)
(courts must look to the "context in which [the confession was] made" to determine voluntariness);
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960) (voluntariness depends on the "pertinent circumstances"); Crooke v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 440 (1958) (the court must weigh the "sum total of
the circumstances" in determining voluntariness).
Many commentators have suggested that the totality of circumstances approach is simply a
means for a court to express its opinion that, in a given case, there was a causal relationship
between police misconduct and the subsequent confession. See Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will,
and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. Rav. 859 (1979); White, Police Trickery in Inducing Coofes.
sions, 127 U. PA. L. REv.581 (1979); Note, Police Use ofTrickery as an InterrogationTechnique,
32 VAND. L. REv. 1167 (1979).
4. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961) (confession is invountary if the behavior of
the police caused the suspect's will to resist to be overborne).
5. 308 N.C. 549, 304 S.E.2d 134 (1983).
6. Noncustodial interrogations are distinguished from custodial interrogations on the basis
of whether defendant's freedom of action is restricted. During noncustodial interrogations, the
defendant is free to leave at will. At custodial interrogations the defendant's presence can be
compelled. Furthermore, Miranda warnings are required for custodial interrogations but not for
noncustodial interrogations. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
Miranda warnings are the procedural safeguards that must be read to a defendant prior to a
custodial interrogation. The defendant must be warned that "he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id. at 444.
7. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 574, 304 S.E.2d at 148 ("while deceptive methods or false statements
by police officers are not commendable practices, standing alone they do not render a confession
of guilt inadmissible").
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ior and virtually emasculated the principle of fundamental fairness. 8 In
analyzing the court's decision, this note will discuss whether defendant was
seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment 9 and analyze whether defendant's subsequent confession was given voluntarily under the "totality of
10
circumstances" test.

In Jackson defendant initially was sought by the police as a possible wit-

ness in the stabbing death of Leslie Hall-Kennedy. Jackson had been at the
scene of the murder when the body was discovered; but he left the scene soon

after the police arrived and did not speak to them.
Jackson was interviewed by members of the Raleigh Police Department
on three occasions during the course of the investigation." During the second
interview the police told Jackson that they had found bloodstains on the pants
he had given them the previous day and that tracks from his tennis shoes had
been found in the victim's house. 12 Jackson knew that the police did not have
such evidence, however, because he had not given them the clothes he had
worn on the night of the murder.' 3 Jackson denied committing the crime and
stated that "he went with other persons into the apartment . . . after they
4
heard screams coming from the apartment."'
Defendant did not hear from the police again until almost two weeks
later, when a detective approached him on a downtown street to tell him that
8. But cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) (due process expresses a sense of
"fair play"); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (due process protects against fundamental "unfairness" in the use of confessions). See generally Paulsen, The FourteenthAmendment
and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV. 411 (1954) (court will measure police conduct against
certain basic standards of fundamental fairness that are essential to our system of justice).
9. The fourth amendment provides that: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S.
CONsT. amend. IV. See infra note 33.
10. See supra note 3. In ruling that defendant's confession was involuntary and therefore
inadmissible, the trial court relied on language in State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 259 (1827). In
Roberts the court stated that "[c]onfessions are either voluntary or involuntary. They are called
voluntary, when made neither under the influence of hope or fear, but are attributable to that love
...
Id. at 261. The trial court conof truth which predominates in the breast of every man.
cluded that defendant confessed because his guilt had been ascertained rather than for a "love of
truth"; thus, the confession was ruled involuntary. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 584, 304 S.E.2d at 154.
In reversing the trial court, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that "it has never been
held by this Court that a confession is inadmissible in evidence unless it is 'attributable to that love
of truth which predominates in the breast of every man.'" Id (quoting Record at 25). The court
stated that "[t]he North Carolina test to determine the admissibility of a confession continues to be
whether the confession is voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the case." Id. at 585,
304 S.E.2d at 154. In his dissent, Justice Exum claimed that under North Carolina case law,
trickery or deception on the part of the police rendered a confession involuntary and inadmissible.
Id. at 599, 304 S.E.2d at 162 (Exum, J., dissenting).
11. The investigation lasted from March 15, 1983, until April 8, 1983. Jackson was questioned by the police on March 26th, March 27th, and April 8th. The April 8th interview, during
which the defendant confessed, lasted approximately five hours. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 551-59, 304
S.E.2d at 135-39.
12. Id. at 566, 304 S.E.2d at 143. Both of these statements were false, id., and presumably
defendant realized they were false.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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Detective Mack wanted to talk with him about the Hall-Kennedy murder.

Defendant was not arrested; he voluntarily got into the detective's car and
went to the police station.' 5 During the course of the five-hour interroga-

tion,' 6 defendant was told that "the police had a murder weapon; they had
defendant's fingerprints.

. .

and that they had a witness who saw the defend-

ant coming out the door carrying a knife."' 17 The police, in fact, had not found
defendant's fingerprints on the weapon nor was there any such eyewitness ac-

count.1 8 Shortly after the recitation of these facts, defendant confessed.' 9
On April 27, 1981 a grand jury returned a bill of indictment charging
defendant with first degree murder. 20 Defendant filed a motion to suppress

the use of oral and written statements that the officers had solicited from him.
He alleged that his statements had been obtained in violation of his fourth and

fifth amendment rights under the constitutions of North Carolina and the
United States, and in contravention of North Carolina case law. 2 ' The superior court granted defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, stating that his
standard for the admissibility of
confession failed to meet the North Carolina
22
confessions articulated in State v. Roberts.
On appeal 23 to the North Carolina Supreme Court, the State argued that

the trial court had applied an improper standard in determining whether the
confession had been voluntary. 24 The supreme court agreed, stating that "the

North Carolina test to determine the admissibility of a confession continues to
be whether the confession is voluntary under the totality of the circum-

stances."'25 In reversing the superior court, the court concluded that police
15. Id. at 566, 304 S.E.2d at 144. Miranda warnings are required only when a suspect is
taken into custody. See supra note 6.
16. See supra note 11.
17. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 568, 304 S.E.2d at 144. Although defendant probably knew that
earlier statements made by the police were untrue, there was no evidence nor any finding by the
trial court that defendant knew that the evidence concerning his fingerprints or the witness who
saw him was fabricated. Id. at 601, 304 S.E.2d at 163.
18. Id. at 601, 304 S.E.2d at 163.
19. Id. at 568, 304 S.E.2d at 144.
20. Id. at 550, 304 S.E.2d at 135.
21. Id. Defendant argued that his fourth amendment rights were violated because he had
been seized illegally, and that his fifth amendment rights were contravened because the coercive
methods employed by the police had elicited an involuntary confession. Id.
22. State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 259 (1827). The superior court stated that "the defendant 'confessed' because he was found out and caught, rather than because such confession was
'attributable to that love of truth which predominates in every man, not operated upon by other
motives more powerful with him, and thus the confession was not admissible under state law."
Jackson, 308 N.C. at 562, 304 S.E.2d at 141. See supra note 10.
Although the court granted defendant's motion to suppress, defendant's contention that the
police violated his rights under the constitutions of the United States and the State of North
Carolina was rejected. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 562, 304 S.E.2d at 141. Justice Exum, in his dissent,
challenged this conclusion. Id. at 602, 304 S.E.2d at 164 (Exum, J., dissenting).
23. The State appealed pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-979(c) (1983) and rule 4 of the
North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedures. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 550, 304 S.E.2d at 135.
24. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 584-85, 304 S.E.2d at 153-54.
25. Id. at 585, 304 S.E.2d at 154. See State v. Schneider, 306 N.C. 351, 355, 293 S.E.2d 157,
160 (1982) ("Voluntariness is to be determined from consideration of all circumstances surrounding the confession."); State v. Booker, 306 N.C. 302, 311, 293 S.E.2d 78, 83 (1982) (key question
concerning voluntariness is "whether the totality of the evidence, including both the uncontro-
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confess."

'2 6

The court balanced the societal interest in obtaining confessions against the
interest in safeguarding defendants' rights, and concluded that the interest

served by extracting confessions should prevail unless the methods employed
were likely to produce an unreliable confession.2 7 With this conclusion the

court sought to avoid the situation in which relatively harmless police misconduct renders an otherwise valid confession inadmissible. 28 Jackson presents

two critical issues: whether defendant's confession was inadmissible because it
followed an unlawful seizure under the fourth amendment and whether the

confession was inadmissible because it was given involuntarily.
The fourth amendment protects an individual from unreasonable
searches and seizures by law enforcement officials. 29 This safeguard applies to
seizures of individuals as well as seizures of tangible goods.30 The linchpin of
the fourth amendment is probable cause. 31 For police officers to effect a law-

ful arrest or seizure, there must be probable cause for their action. In Brinegar
v. United States 32 the United States Supreme Court held that probable cause

"exists where 'the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and
of which [they] had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in

themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an of33
fense has been or is being committed."

The protection afforded by the fourth amendment is effectuated by the
exclusionary rule,34 a judicial device requiring the suppression of evidence obtained by law enforcement officers in contravention of the Constitution. The
policy underlying this sanction against illegal police conduct is to "compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty [of the fourth amendment] in the only
verted evidence and the evidence in conflict, amounted to such coercion, actual or psychological,
as would render defendant's confession involuntary"); State v. Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 419-20, 290
S.E.2d 574, 586 (1982) (voluntariness is determined "based upon. . . examination and consideration of the entire record on appeal"); State v. Morgan, 299 N.C. 191, 198, 261 S.E.2d 827, 831-32
(1980) (test for voluntariness is "whether, from the totality of the circumstances,. . . such mental
or psychological pressure was brought to bear against defendant so as to overcome his will").
26. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 573, 304 S.E.2d at 148. (citing the standard for admissibility of
confessions suggested in F. IMBAU, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 218 (1967)).
27. Id. at 573-74, 304 S.E.2d at 148.
28. Id. at 573, 304 S.E.2d at 148.
29. See supra note 9.
30. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390-

92 (1914).
31. C.

WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

§ 3.02 (1980). Because police conceded there

was no probable cause to arrest or seize Jackson, his status during the interrogation was a pivotal
issue at the suppression hearing. In his concurring opinion to the 4-3 decision, Justice Mitchell
stated, "Had it not been established. . . that the defendant was not in custody at the time of his
confession, I might well join the dissenters." Jackson, 308 N.C.'at 587, 304 S.E.2d at 155.
32. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
33. Id. at 175-76 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
34. The exclusionary rule was established in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
See generally 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURES: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§§ 1.1 to 1.1 1 (1978). The United States Supreme Court carved out exceptions to the exclusionary
rule in opinions announced July 5, 1984. See United States v. Leon, 52 U.S.L.W. 5155 (1984);
Segura v. United States, 52 U.S.L.W. 5128 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 52 U.S.L.W. 5177
(1984). These decisions do not change the arguments made in this note.
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effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."' 35 Thus,
any evidence, including verbal and written statements made by defendant, obtained pursuant to an illegal arrest or seizure must be excluded from use at
trial.
In United States v. Mendenhall 36 the Supreme Court articulated the reasonable man standard for determining whether a defendant had been seized
properly under the fourth amendment. The Court stated that "a person has
been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of
all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed he was not free to leave." 37 The following circumstances might
indicate a seizure: "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, and
the use of language or a tone of voice indicating that compliance with the
'38
officer's request might be compelled.
The North Carolina Supreme Court adopted the Mendenhall standard in
State v. Freeman.39 In Freeman the court ruled that defendant was entitled to
a new trial because inculpatory statements made by defendant and introduced
at trial were the product of an illegal seizure. 40 Defendant was "picked up" by
the police after his sister made statements to the police that incriminated him
in an arson case. When an officer from the police force confronted defendant
at his home, he stated: "Detective Parham. . .asked me to come by and pick
[you] up."4 1 The officer also informed the suspect about the incriminating
statements his sister had made to the police. Defendant accompanied the officer to the law enforcement center and was taken to a small room where he
was advised of his Miranda rights. After being interrogated for approximately
three and one-half hours, defendant confessed. 4 2 At trial, the State introduced
43
defendant's confession into evidence, and defendant was convicted.
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court granted defendant a new
trial, stating that his confession was inadmissible because it was the product of
an illegal seizure.4 4 The Court emphasized that the officer's declaration that
he was there to "pick him up," coupled with his revelation of defendant's sister's accusatory statement, could have led a reasonable person to believe that
45
his compliance with the deputy's request might be compelled.
35. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
36. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).

37. Id. at 554.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
307 N.C. 357, 298 S.E.2d 331 (1983).
Id. at 358, 298 S.E.2d at 332.
Id. at 361, 298 S.E.2d at 333.
Id. at 361, 298 S.E.2d at 333-34.

43. At the pretrial hearing, defendant argued that his confession should be excluded from
trial because it was the product of an illegal seizure. After hearing the evidence, the Court denied
this motion, stating that defendant's confession was given voluntarily and that "applicable procedures concerning custodial interrogation of defendant. . . were complied with." Id.
44. Id. at 363, 298 S.E.2d at 335.
45. Id. In Freeman the North Carolina Supreme Court cited its landmark decision in State v.
Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 290 S.E.2d 574 (1982), the first case in which the court applied Mendenhall.
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In Jackson the critical encounter for purposes of fourth amendment analysis occurred on April 8, 1981-it was during that interrogation that defendant

confessed. Based on the reasonable man standard enunciated in Mendenhall
and applied in Freeman, the court's conclusion that defendant had not been

seized was warranted. Two key facts support the court's finding. First, defendant was not arrested when confronted by police on April 8, 1981, but was

simply told that "the [police] wanted to talk with him again in reference to the
murder on Cox Avenue."'46 Following this exchange with the police, defendant voluntarily entered the police car and accompanied the officers to the station. The circumstances surrounding this encounter were different from those
in Freeman, in which defendant was told specifically by the officer that he was

there "to pick him up." In Freeman there was no doubt that, given the officer's
authoritative command, defendant's presence would have been compelled had

he resisted. The same conclusion, however, cannot be drawn in Jackson; the
officer merely requested defendant's presence at the station.

The second key fact is that Jackson was told by officers that he was free to
leave.47 This statement certainly would have served notice to a reasonable
person that his participation in the interrogation would not be compelled.
This conclusion is buttressed by defendant's own testimony that the officers
48
did not arrest him but just wanted to talk with him.
The facts in Jackson clearly indicate that defendant had not been seized
on the evening he confessed. There was nothing in the conduct of the officers

during the initial encounter on April 8, 1981, or the interrogation that ensued,
which would have indicated to a reasonable person that he had been taken
into custody or deprived significantly of his freedom of movement. The record does not reveal any of the circumstances delineated by the Supreme Court

in Mendenhall as indicia of seizure. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that
defendant was given water and coffee, and was allowed to use the bathroom at
his request. 49 Thus, the facts of the case support the court's conclusion that
defendant had not been seized.
In Davis a member of the Asheville Police Department received information that led him to consider defendant as a suspect in a recent murder. At the police's request, defendant came to the
station for questioning. After being advised of his Miranda rights, defendant was interrogated
concerning the murder. Defendant disavowed any knowledge of the crime, but agreed to take a
polygraph test. Once inside the polygraph room, however, defendant refused to take the test.
Following his refusal to take the test, at approximately 8:00 p.m., a detective gave defendant a ride
home and asked him to return to the station at 10:00 p.m. The defendant agreed to do so. Upon
returning to the station, defendant again was advised of his Miranda rights and, after a brief
period of interrogation, defendant confessed. Davis, 305 N.C. at 403-04, 290 S.E.2d at 577.
At the pretrial hearing, defendant argued that his confession should be suppressed because it
was the result of an illegal seizure. Because the State conceded there was no probable cause to
arrest defendant, the defendant's status during the interrogation period was the pivotal issue in the
case. Applying the reasonable man standard enunciated in Mendenhall, the court held that defendant had not been in custody or deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Id. at
419-20, 290 S.E.2d at 581.
46. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 576, 304 S.E.2d at 149.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 578, 304 S.E.2d at 150.
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The next issue for determination is whether defendant's confession was
voluntary and therefore admissible. The United States Supreme Court has
held that, to comport with the fourteenth amendment due process require-

ment, confessions must be given voluntarily.50 Resolution of the voluntariness
issue hinges on whether tactics used by the police caused defendant's will to
resist to be "overborne." 5 1 If a defendant's confession is given freely, without

physical or mental duress, it is admissible. If, however, defendant confesses
because police methods overbear his will, then it is given involuntarily and is
not admissible at trial. The due process voluntariness standard seeks to ensure
the reliability of a defendant's confession by prohibiting the use of coerced

52
confessions to convict a defendant.
Although the thrust of the voluntariness standard is stated easily, it is
difficult to apply because there is no single test for determining when interrogations are constitutionally permissible. As Justice Goldberg noted: "The line
between proper and permissible police conduct and techniques and methods

offensive to due process is.

.

. difficult.

. .

to draw, particularly.

. .

where it

is necessary to make fine judgments as to the effect of psychologically coercive
pressures and inducements on the mind and will of an accused." 5 3 In the
absence of specific guidelines categorizing particular methods as per se violations of due process, courts have applied the "totality of the circumstances"
test.

54

Although the Jackson court applied the proper "totality of circumstances" standard 55 for determining voluntariness, the court erred in concluding that Jackson's confession had been rendered voluntarily.5 6 Two elements
can be found in the Jackson case which require a finding that the confession
was involuntary. First, the police used threats and promises to overcome defendant's will to resist.5 7 Second, the police used trickery and deception to
elicit the confession.5 8
The facts support the argument that the police used threats and promises
50. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). In Brown a deputy sheriff, after severely beatig one of the defendants, claimed that he would continue the beatings until the suspect confessed.
The defendant then agreed to confess. The Court ruled that the use of physical torture had violated the fourteenth amendment requirement of due process. The Court stated that, "state action
* * . shall be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base
of our civil and political institutions." (d. at 286 (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316
(1926)). For additional cases applying the due process voluntariness standard, see supra note 1.
51. See supra note 4.
52. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).
53. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963).
54. See supra notes 3 & 25.
55. See supra note 10.
56. In ruling to suppress confessions for lack of voluntariness, the North Carolina Supreme
Court has emphasized various elements that, under the totality of the circumstances, caused the
defendant's will to be overborne. See, e.g., State v. Stevenson, 212 N.C. 648, 194 S.E. 81 (1937)
(misrepresentation of the quantum of evidence); State v. Pruitt, 286 N.C. 442, 212 S.E.2d 92 (1975)
(suggestions of hope or fear); State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. 259 (1 Dev.) (1827) (false statements concerning the admissibility of evidence).
57. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 586-90, 304 S.E.2d at 155-57 (Exum, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 553-59, 304 S.E.2d at 137-39.
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to induce Jackson's confession. The officers admitted to telling defendant,

among other things, that "if he did go to the gas chamber, nobody, after the
pill was dropped in the bucket of water, would rush in to save his life," 59 and
that "he could go into court and plead not guilty and if he did that then the
other officers would probably go into court and testify that he was a black man
out here viciously raping and murdering white women."' 60 Moreover, one officer told defendant that "if he would tell the truth about the incident that it
would certainly come out in court that he cooperated." 6 1 The police officers
also intimated that if defendant did not confess, they would introduce

fabricated evidence against him at trial.62 These statements clearly are indicia

of "threats or promises" calculated to induce defendant's confession. In nu-

merous cases, the court has declared confessions involuntary on facts far less
compelling than those in Jackson 63

In addition to inducing Jackson's confession through the use of implied
threats and promises, police unduly influenced the substance of his statements

by raising the specter of the death penalty. 64 During the interrogation, officers

told Jackson that first degree murder carried a sentence of death unless there
were "extenuating circumstances. 65s In explaining what would constitute ex-

tenuating circumstances, one of the officers stated:
[I]f you did kill the girl and you done it by accident, or it wasn't

premeditated, or it happened at a rational moment, irrational moment or something to that effect, that the judge and jury should know
that. . . not that you premeditated, set there with a knife and went
through the house and 66stabbed her without some other circumstance
besides premeditation.
Jackson clearly incorporated the officer's admonition that extenuating cir-

cumstances could spare him from the death penalty into his confession. He
59. Id. at 587, 304 S.E.2d at 155 (Exum, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 590, 304 S.E.2d at 157 (Exum, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 589, 304 S.E.2d at 156 (Exum, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 590, 304 S.E.2d at 157 (Exum, J., dissenting).
63. In State v. Pruitt, 286 N.C. 442, 212 S.E.2d 92 (1975), police officers told defendant that
they knew he was "lying" and that they did not want to "fool around." In addition, defendant
was told that it would be "harder on him" if he did not cooperate. The North Carolina Supreme
Court ruled that the confession had been given involuntarily because it had been "made under the
influence of fear... growing out of the language and acts of those who held him in custody." Id.
at 458, 212 S.E.2d at 102-03. In State v. Fox, 274 N.C. 277, 163 S.E.2d 492 (1968), interrogating
officers told the accused that it would be "a lot better" if he would tell the truth about what
happened, and that he would probably only "be charged with being an accessory" to murder.
Again, the court ruled that admission of the confession was prejudicial error because the statements by the officers constituted suggestions of hope and fear. Id. at 292-93, 103 S.E.2d at 503.
Finally, in State v. Stevenson, 212 N.C. 648, 194 S.E. 81 (1937), a case similar to Jackson, the
court ruled defendant's confession involuntary because it had been induced by officers' claims that
they had sufficient evidence to convict defendant.
64. One of the reasons the United States Supreme Court promulgated the voluntariness standard was to ensure the reliability of confessions. The Court was concerned that in the absence of
such a safeguard, police coercion would cause defendants to skew their confessions to fit the fact
scenarios suggested by the police. Jackson vividly illustrates this phenomenon. See supra note 52
and accompanying text.
65. Jackson, 308 N.C. 587, 304 S.E.2d at 155-56 (Exum, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 588, 304 S.E.2d at 156 (Exum, J., dissenting).
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admitted committing the murder, but stated that the victim, a recently married
woman, had invited him to come to her home and, once there, had indicated a
willingness to have sexual relations with him. He claimed that upon his advances toward her67 she began to scream and, in a state of panic, he "stabbed
her in the back."
The reliability of Jackson's confession is questionable. The correlation
between defendant's statements and the officer's suggestions concerning the
mitigating effect of extenuating circumstances is too great to disregard. In fact,
the trial judge ordiered the suppression of defendant's confession because he
doubted its veracity.68
The second, and perhaps most compelling, reason for concluding that
Jackson's confession was given involuntarily is that the police used trickery
and deception to extract his statements. During the second interview police
told defendant that they had found bloodstains on the pants he had given
them, and that tracks from his tennis shoes had been found in the victim's
house. Both statements were false.6 9 Furthermore, in preparation for the
third interview, one of the detectives obtained a knife identical to the one believed to be the murder weapon, smeared blood on it, and placed his right
thumb print in the blood. 70 Then, with the bloody knife lying on the interview
table, another detective told defendant that the police had found the murder
weapon, a knife, and that his fingerprints had been lifted from the weapon.
Defendant also was told that the police had a witness who saw him coming out
of the victim's front door carrying a knife.7 1 After being confronted with these
falsehoods, defendant confessed.
Based on the extreme fact situation in Jackson, it is inconceivable that a
court, applying the totality of circumstances test, could conclude that defendant's confession was voluntary. The error of the court's conclusion is demonstrated by the fact that any one of the tactics used by the police-threats, false
statements, or trickery-might have been sufficient to cause defendant's will to
be overborne. Any test that purports to measure whether a defendant's will
has been overborne, yet is flexible enough to accommodate the unconscionable
methods used by the police in Jackson, is seriously deficient.
In his dissent, Justice Exum argued that prior to Jackson72 the use of
trickery and false statements had been sufficient to render the resulting confession involuntary under State v. Stephens73 and State v. Anderson.74 In Stephens investigators told defendant and his attorney that the attorney could not
be present during the polygraph examination but that he could be present during the subsequent interrogation. The investigators started questioning the de67.
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Id. at 563, 304 S.E.2d at 141-42.
Id. at 600, 304 S.E.2d at 163 (Exum, J., dissenting).
Id. at 566, 304 S.E.2d at 143-39. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
Jackson, 308 N.C. at 553, 304 S.E.2d at 137.
Id. at 558-59, 304 S.E.2d at 139.
Id. at 599, 304 S.E.2d at 162 (Exum, J., dissenting).
300 N.C. 321, 266 S.E.2d 588 (1980).
208 N.C. 771, 182 S.E. 643 (1935).
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fendant immediately after the polygraph, however, without informing his
attorney, who had been waiting outside the door. The court suppressed the
confession and stated that "[i]f the totality of circumstances indicates that defendant was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver of his rights, his state75
ments are rendered involuntary as a matter of law."
Stephens fails, however, to support Exum's claim that trickery alone will
render a confession involuntary. The court stated specifically that its decision
to suppress defendant's confession was based on the "totality of the circumstances." 76 Also, Stephens' relevance to Jackson is questionable because it can
be distinguished on its facts. In Stephens the police's trickery effectively deprived defendant of his sixth amendment right to counsel. 77 No correspond-

ing right-to-counsel issue existed in Jackson because the defendant had
waived his sixth amendment right. 78 Also, unlike Stephens, Jackson was not
in custody at the time of his confession. Consequently, the procedural safeguards7 9 offered to people in custody were not in effect.
In Anderson,80 the second case cited by Justice Exum, defendant confessed after being informed that some of his codefendants had "talked" to
police officials. 8 ' The court granted Anderson's motion to suppress. Anderson
supports Justice Exum's proposition that a confession induced by trickery or
deception is inadmissible as a matter of law. The only impropriety by law
enforcement officials was the false allegation concerning statements made by
his accomplices. 8 2 Furthermore, the pertinent facts in Anderson were similar
to those in Jackson. In both cases false statements concerning the quantum of
evidence possessed by the interrogators caused the defendants to confess.
Because the court did not articulate clearly the standard it was applying,
the precedential value of Anderson is diminished. The court simply stated that
"inasmuch as the involuntariness of the alleged confession is apparent from
the testimony of the state's witness. . . we are disposed to disregard form for
'83
merit and to hold that the alleged confession should have been stricken out."
Although Stephens andAnderson do not support Justice Exum's assertion
that prior to Jackson trickery and false statements rendered a confession involuntary, serious attention should be given to promulgating such a rule. In Miranda v. Arizona,84 the Supreme Court attempted to eliminate the "inherently
75. Stephens, 300 N.C. at 327, 266 S.E.2d at 592.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 576, 304 S.E.2d at 149 (court held that although defendant knew he
could have attorney present during questioning, he never requested one).
79. See supra note 6.
80. State v. Anderson, 208 N.C. 771, 182 S.E. 643 (1935).
81. Id. at 780, 180 S.E.2d at 648-49. This precipitous statement by police officials was false.
Id.
82. Because the false statements were the only impropriety mentioned by the court, one can
infer that trickery alone was sufficient to render the confession inadmissible.
83. Anderson, 208 N.C. at 783, 182 S.E.2d at 650.
84. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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coercive" nature of custodial interrogation. 5 By extending certain fifth
amendment protections8 6 to the interrogation room, the Court theorized that
the coercive atmosphere would be reduced. In practice, however, this result
has not occurred because most suspects waive their Miranda rights and, as a
result, interrogation proceeds much as it did prior to Miranda.87 Consequently, the policy goal underlying Miranda-reducingthe coercive atmosphere that permeates police interrogation-has not been realized. Thus, more
effective steps must be taken to defuse the coercive nature of interrogation.
That trickery is an especially coercive interrogation technique is indisputable. Its powerful effect stems in part from the fact that once a suspect believes that evidence of his guilt exists, he may see no further reason to resist
interrogation. The Miranda Court sought to blunt the adverse effect of trickery by prohibiting its use to obtain a waiver of rights.8 8 The Court, however,
did not expressly ban the use of trickery once a waiver was secured. A study
conducted by Professor Driver suggests that the Court did not extend its prohibition against trickery far enough.8 9 In his study, Driver concluded that "[t]he
Miranda warnings failed to provide safeguards against the social psychological rigors of arrest and interrogation except to the extent that they prevent
interrogation altogether." 90
If the deceptive methods, including trickery, threats, and false statements,
employed by the police in Jackson are not sufficient to render a confession
involuntary, one wonders what measure of psychological coercion would transcend the threshold of acceptable police behavior. Unfortunately, the court
did not address this critical question directly. It can be inferred from the
court's silence, however, that police officers are to be given considerable latitude in employing psychological measures of coercion when interrogating
suspects.
As a safeguard against the abusive methods used by the police in Jackson,
North Carolina should adopt the standard on deceptive practices promulgated
in the American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure.
The Code stipulates that:
No law enforcement officer shall attempt to induce an arrested
person to make a statement or otherwise cooperate by. .. any...
85. See supra note 6. Although the Miranda Court was addressing custodial interrogations
specifically, it is arguable that the same policy rationale should apply to noncustodial interroga-

tions as well. As Professor LaFave has noted, "the person who honestly but unreasonably thinks
he is under arrest has been subjected to precisely the same custodial pressures as the person whose
belief in this regard is reasonable." LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry,
Sibron, Peters, andBeyond, 67 MicH. L. REv. 39, 105 (1968).
86. Miranda held that the fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause requires that a person
undergoing custodial interrogation be informed of his right to silence as well as of his right to the

presence of counsel, either obtained or appointed, during interrogation. See supra note 6.
87. See Medalie, Zeitz and Alexander, CustodiaIPoliceInterrogationin Our Nation's Capital
TheAttempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1347, 1394-95 (1968); Comment, Interroga.
tions in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1562-78, 1613-16 (1967).
88. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.
89. Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REv. 42 (1968).
90. Id. at 59.
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method which, in light of such person's age, intelligence and mental
and physical condition, unfairly undermines his ability to make a
choice whether to make a statement or otherwise cooperate. 9 1
Under this provision, a suspect's confession would be inadmissible if police
tactics impaired his ability to make a rational decision. This standard would
protect the fifth amendment and due process rights of defendants without hindering police interrogation.
In conclusion, the Jackson court's decision increases the quantum of evidence a defendant must present to demonstrate that his will was overborne by
the circumstances surrounding his confession. This undermines the United
States Supreme Court's objective in promulgating the voluntariness standard. 92 As a consequence, it is probable that confessions will be less reliable
and defendants subject to greater coercion than before Jackson. To defuse the
coercive atmosphere that envelops police interrogation, North Carolina should
adopt the deceptive practices standard recommended by the American Law
Institute.
ROBERT MANNER HURLEY

91. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, § 140.4 (Proposed Official Draft

1975).
92. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.

